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TAXATION
OVERVIEW
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals selected for publication approxi-
mately half of the federal taxation cases it decided in the period covered by
this survey. For the most part, the court addressed routine issues and fol-
lowed established precedents. Some of the issues considered, however, in-
cluding third-party recordkeeper summonses and the availability of the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination in the tax context, are cur-
rently of major interest throughout the country. The primary consideration
in preparing this article was to elucidate the Tenth Circuit's interpretation
of the law in order to aid attorneys in preparing presentations to the court.
I. CRITERIA FOR IMPOSING THE ACCUMULATED EARNINGS TAX
In Guarantee Abstract Tile Co. v. United States ,I the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed the issue of what constituted sufficient evidence of a com-
pany's plan for using its accumulated earnings to avoid imposition of the
accumulated earnings tax. 2 In contesting imposition of the accumulated
earnings tax, the taxpayer must present objective evidence of a specific and
definite plan for using accumulated earnings. 3 The plan need not be writ-
ten.4 The "reasonableness" of the need for the questioned accumulation is
determined case by case on a fact and circumstances basis in light of the
specific plan of the company in question.
5
In Guarantee Abstract the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judg-
ment, finding sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Guaran-
tee had a definite plan for its accumulated earnings, and that the
accumulations were reasonable in light of that plan.6 The court observed
that although a formal plan would normally be contained in corporate min-
utes, a closely held corporation like Guarantee might be run informally and
a definite plan might not be found in the minutes.
7
The court of appeals found objective evidence of a definite plan in the
testimony of the stockholders and their accountants. This testimony showed
1. 696 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1983).
2. I.R.C. §§ 531-537 (1982). The accumulated earnings tax is a penalty tax imposed
upon corporations which accumulate earnings beyond the reasonable needs of their business.
See id §§ 531-533. Its purpose is to prevent avoidance of the income tax imposed on distribu-
tions to shareholders. See id. § 532. See generally United States v. Donruss Co., 393 U.S. 297, 303
(i969).
3. 696 F.2d at 795 (citing Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 494 F.2d 429,
433-34 (10th Cir. 1974); Henry Van Hummell, Inc. v. Commissioner, 364 F.2d 746, 750 (10th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 US. 956 (1967)).
4. 696 F.2d at 795 (citing Hogg's Oyster Co. v. United States, 676 F.2d 1015, 1018 (4th
Cir. 1982)).
5. Cf Treas. Reg. 1.533-1(2) (1959) (tax avoidance purpose in accumulating earnings to
be determined on case by case basis).
6. 696 F.2d at 795-96.
7. Id at 795.
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that Guarantee, an abstract and title company, intended to become a title
insurance company and required increased accumulations to insure against
the higher risks associated with the title insurance business.8 There was also
evidence that the earnings were accumulated to cover anticipated increased
operating expenses as well as potential policy and litigation losses.9 The
court viewed Guarantee's practice of keeping its accumulated earnings in
short term notes on deposit with mortgage lenders as corroborative of its
asserted plan, because that practice ensured liquidity to meet title losses and
was a reasonable method of generating title business.1 ° In light of Guaran-
tee's proof of an established plan, the accumulated earnings tax was held to
have been improperly assessed against Guarantee, entitling Guarantee to a
refund of the accumulated earnings tax it had paid. "1
II. MINIMUM TAX: AN INCOME TAX THAT CAN CONSTITUTIONALLY BE
APPLIED RETROACTIVELY
In Ward v. United Slates, 12 the court considered several issues regarding
the minimum tax. The minimum tax is a tax, in addition to the regular
income tax, which is imposed on individuals and corporations having tax
preference income in excess of a specified amount. 13 Congress' purpose in
imposing the minimum tax was to increase the income tax liability of tax-
payers who are able to reduce their taxable income drastically by claiming
preferential tax treatment with respect to special income items or allowed
deductions. 14
The Wards were independent oil and gas producers who, in 1964,
elected to exercise their one-time option to deduct all intangible drilling
costs (IDC's) associated with their drilling programs as current expenses,
rather than to capitalize and amortize those costs. 15
In 1976, Congress added intangible drilling costs to the list of tax prefer-
ence items, and imposed a minimum tax on the amount by which the one-
time deduction for these costs exceeded the amount which would have been
deductible if such costs had been capitalized using the straight line method
of amortization.16 This tax was imposed on the Ward's income for 1976,
8. Id
9. Id Evidence of Guarantee's past losses was significant in establishing the reasonable-
ness of its reserves. See id. Accumulation for theoretical contingencies is insufficient to avoid the
accumulated earnings penalty. See Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 494 F.2d 429,
433 (10th Cir. 1974).
10. 696 F.2d at 796.
11. Id
12. 695 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1982).
13. See I.R.C. §§ 55, 56 (1982) (amended 1983). Tax preference income includes both di-
rect cash income and direct economic benefits such as accelerated depreciation. E.g., Graff v.
Commissioner, 74 T.C. 743, 766 (1980).
14. H.R. REP. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 78, reprntedin 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1645, 1725 and 1969-3 C.B. 200, 249; S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., lst Sess. 113,
reprntedin 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 1645, 2144 and 1969-3 C.B. 423, 426.
15. 695 F.2d at 1352. The Wards exercised the option provided by I.R.C. § 263(c) (1982)
(amended 1983). This is an irrevocable option which a taxpayer may elect only in the first
taxable year in which intangible drilling costs are incurred. See Treas. Reg. 1.612-4(d)(1965).
16. See I.R.C. § 57(a)(I1), (d)(1982).
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thereby increasing their tax liability.
17
After paying the increased minimum tax and being denied a refund, the
Wards sued to recover the tax paid. 8 The Wards claimed that imposing the
tax retroactively to the beginning of the taxable year was unconstitutional
and that, even if the retroactive application was constitutional, the tax was
not an income tax but an excise tax and therefore deductible as an ordinary
business expense.' 9 The district court rejected these contentions, and granted
summary judgment in favor of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
2 0
A. Retroactive Application of the Minimum Tax is Constitutional
The Tenth Circuit held that due process is not necessarily violated by
retroactive application of an income tax statute to the entire calendar year of
its enactment. 2' Rather, it is necessary to consider the nature of the tax and
the circumstances surrounding its enactment in order to determine whether
it can be retroactively applied.2 2 The court noted a distinction between im-
posing a tax on an activity never before taxed and changing the rate for an
activity already taxed.2 3 In the latter case, the taxpayer has no vested right
in any particular tax rate, because it is readily foreseeable that Congress can-
and will change existing tax rates24 The Wards argued, however, that they
could not have forseen that IDC's would be added to the list of minimum
tax preference items, and that retroactive imposition of this tax change was
therefore unconstitutional as to them. This argument was rejected by the
court because evidence showed that the Wards had lobbied extensively
against the inclusion of IDC's as a tax preference item, and therefore should
have been able to forsee the extension of the minimum tax. 25 Hence, retro-
active imposition of the tax on the Wards was not unconstitutional.
26
The court supported its holding by pointing to two policy considera-
tions indicating that courts should defer to Congress' retroactive application
of a tax. First, because the income tax is not a penalty but a means of appor-
tioning the cost of government, retroactivity allows "better allocation" of the
tax burden to those Congress decides should bear it. 27 Second, the court
observed that the Supreme Court has regularly upheld the constitutionality
of Congress' practice of giving general revenue statutes retroactive applica-
17. 695 F.2d at 1352.
18. Id
19. Id at 1352-53.
20. Id at 1352.
21. Id at 1353 (quoting United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292, 296-97 (1981)). Danis-
mont upheld retroactive application of increases in existing minimum tax provisions. 449 U.S.
at 300-01.
22. 695 F.2d at 1353 (quoting Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 147-48 (1938)).
23. 695 F.2d at 1354 (quoting Appendrodt v. United States, 490 F. Supp. 490, 492 (W.D.
Pa. 1980) (quoting Judge Learned Hand in Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 545 (2d Cir.
1930))).
24. 695 F.2d at 1354.
25. Id The district court found that Mr. Ward had made several trips to Washington
during 1975-76 to lobby against the tax, and that he should therefore have considered the possi-
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tion to the entire calendar year of enactment.
28
B. The Minimum Tax is an Income Tax
The Tenth Circuit also disagreed with the Wards' contention that the
minimum tax was an excise tax and hence deductible as an ordinary busi-
ness expense.29 The language of the statute states that the minimum tax is
imposed "[i]n addition to the other taxes imposed by this chapter." 30 The
court observed that the IRS has "consistently treated the tax as an income
tax," 3' and pointed out that all other courts which have considered the issue
have found the minimum tax to be an income tax. 32 Further, the legislative
history of the minimum tax indicated that Congress intended the minimum
tax to be an income tax.33 The court then rejected the Wards' claimed re-
fund because the minimum tax, as an income tax, is "specifically barred as a
deduction."
34
III. SOLE SHAREHOLDER HAS NO RIGHT TO DEDUCT INTEREST PAID ON
CORPORATE DEBT
In Crouch v. United States35 the Tenth Circuit considered two claims
made by the sole shareholder of a corporation: 1) that he was entitled to
deduct the corporation's net operating loss from his personal return because
the corporation was a subchapter S corporation, 36 and 2) that he was enti-
tled to a personal deduction for interest paid on a loan made to his corpora-
tion.3 7 The court affirmed the district court's denial of both claims.
38
A. Personal Deduction for Interest Paid on Corporate Indebtedness
With respect to the interest deduction, the facts revealed that Crouch,
as sole shareholder, had formed Seventeen Ventures, Inc. to build a luxury
apartment complex in Florida. 39 Crouch had used the corporate form to
avoid state usury law limitations on the interest which could be charged on
loans to individuals. 4° Crouch personally guaranteed payment of the corpo-
ration's note, agreeing that the lender need not pursue any remedies against
the corporation before collecting under the guarantee. 4 ' Crouch's subse-
quent payments on the corporate indebtedness included an interest compo-
nent, which he deducted on his personal tax return.
42
28. Id. at 1353.
29. Id at 1355. See I.R.C. § 56(a)(1982).
30. I.R.C. § 56(a)(1982).
31. 695 F.2d at 1355 (citing Rev. Rul. 77-396, 1977-2 C.B. 86).
32. 695 F.2d at 1355.
33. Id
34. Id I.R.C. § 275(a)(1)(1982) specifically disallows deductions for federal income taxes.
35. 692 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1982).
36. Id at 98.
37. Id
38. Id. at 100-01.





In affirming the district court's order upholding the IRS's denial of the
interest deduction, the Tenth Circuit observed that interest payments are
deductible only if made with respect to a taxpayer's own debts.4 3 Crouch
had contended that the debt was personal to him because of the uncondi-
tional guarantee, and because the lender knew the corporation could not
make the payments and expected Crouch to pay.44 The court held, how-
ever, that the corporate form of a transaction cannot be ignored when that
form has served a legitimate purpose.4 5 The corporate form had served
Crouch's purpose to avoid the usury laws, and he was bound to accept the
tax consequences of his choice. Because the corporation was a legal entity
separate from its shareholder the corporation, and not its sole shareholder
Crouch, was entitled to the deduction for interest payments on corporate
debt .46
Crouch argued alternatively that he was entitled to deduct the interest
payment on the corporate debt because he was the equitable owner of the
corporate assets.4 7 The court held that the concept of equitable ownership
applied in only two situations,4 8 neither of which was present. 49 Thus, this
exception did not entitle Crouch to a personal deduction for the interest paid
on his corporation's indebtedness.
50
B. Loss of Subchapter S Status for Seventeen Ventures, Inc.
The Tenth Circuit also considered Crouch's claim that he was entitled
to a personal deduction for the 1970 net operating loss suffered by Seventeen
Ventures, Inc., which had become a subchapter S corporation in 1969.51
The court affirmed the district court's determination that because Seventeen
Ventures had lost its subchapter S status, Crouch was not entitled to a de-
duction based on passthrough of the net operating loss.
52
Crouch presented two arguments in opposition to this result. The gov-
ernment had asserted that more than twenty percent of the corporation's
gross receipts were rent, which was passive investment income, and that the
corporation's subchapter S status was therefore automatically terminated
43. Id at 99.
44. Id
45. Id
46. Id. at 100.
47. Id Treas. Reg. § 1.163-1(b) (1957) permits a taxpayer to deduct interest payments he
makes pursuant to real estate mortgage when the taxpayer is the legal or equitable owner of the
nortgaged property even though the taxpayer is not directly liable on the note incident to the
mortgage.
48. The Tenth Circuit held that the concept of equitable ownership under Treas. Reg.
§ 1.163-1(b)(1957) is only applicable either 1) when a trust beneficiary has equitable title to
property held by a trustee, or 2) under the doctrine of equitable conversion when real estate has
been sold under a contract for a deed with legal title remaining in the seller until the total
purchase price has been paid. 692 F.2d at 100. The Tenth Circuit did not rule on the IRS
argument that the regulation could not, as a matter of law, apply in the close corporation
context. Id.
49. 692 F.2d at 100.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 98.
52. Id at 101.
1984]
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under the existing subchapter S statute. 53 In opposition, Crouch first argued
that the rent received was not passive investment income, but rather was
income derived from the active business operation of the corporation, which
was renting apartments. 54 The Tenth Circuit pointed out that the then-
existing subchapter S explicitly listed rent as passive investment income,
55
and declined to accept Crouch's argument that the rent derived from the
business of renting apartments was not passive investment income.
56
Crouch then argued that Seventeen Ventures provided "significant
services" in connection with renting its apartments, so that, under a sub-
chapter S regulation,5 7 the payments received were not "rents" within the
meaning of subchapter S.58 The court found that the services provided by
Seventeen Ventures were those commonly provided in luxury apartment
complexes, 59 and held that the exemption Crouch relied on was provided for
operations similar to hotels and motels, not for apartment complexes provid-
ing deluxe services. 6° Hence, the rents received were passive investment in-
come, and because those rents constituted more than twenty percent of the
corporation's gross receipts, the corporation's subchapter S status was lost.
6 1
Given the loss of subchapter S status, there could be no passthrough of the
corporation's net operating loss to Crouch.
6 2
IV. FIFrH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION IN
CIVIL TAX PROCEEDINGS
Only those subject to actual or potential criminal prosecution can claim
the fifth amendment 63 privilege against self-incrimination. 64 In the federal
tax context, a taxpayer can be subject to both civil and criminal penalties for
an act or subject only to civil penalties, depending on the penalty provision
53. Id at 100. At the time Crouch was decided, I.R.C. § 1372(e)(5) (1982) provided that if
a subchapter S corporation received more than 20% of its gross receipts from passive investment
income, its subchapter S status was automatically terminated. Congress amended subchapter
S's passive income automatic termination provisions in the Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669, 1674 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3) (1982).
54. 692 F.2d at 100.
55. I.R.C. § 1372(e)(5)(C)(1976)(amended by Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669, 1674 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 1362(d)(3)(D)(1982))).
56. 692 F.2d at 101. The court relied on its decision in Marshall v. Commissioner, 510
F.2d 259 (10th Cir. 1975), which held that a taxpayer in the business of making loans was not
entitled to subchapter S status because subchapter S listed interest as passive investment in-
come. Id at 264.
57. Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(5)(iv)(b)(vi)(1959) provides that rents do not include pay-
ment for use of rooms where "significant services" are rendered to the occupant. "Significant
services" are rendered to an occupant if the services are primarily for his convenience and are
other than those customarily rendered in connection with rental for occupancy only. Examples
of "significant services" are maid services and parking of autos; heat, light, and trash collection
are not such services. Id.
58. 692 F.2d at 101.





63. U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 3 provides: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself....
64. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
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of the statute in question. The determination of whether or not a taxpayer
may claim the benefit of the fifth amendment privilege depends upon
whether he is subject, or has a reasonable belief that he may be subject, to
criminal prosecution. 65 Among the cases the Tenth Circuit considered in-
volving a taxpayer's assertion of the fifth amendment privilege were two in
which the court reached apparently opposite conclusions. 66 A comparison of
these two cases, however, illuminates the precise analysis necessary for suc-
cess in this area of law rather than inconsistent holdings.
A. Mertsching v. United States
The facts in Mertsching v. United Slates67 revealed that Mertsching, a tax
preparer, was assessed penalties for "negligently or intentionally disregard-
ing revenue rules and regulations in preparing tax returns."'68 Specifically,
the IRS contended that Mertsching prepared returns which sought to assign
income by means which well established case law held impermissible.
69
Mertsching paid fifteen percent of the penalties, thereby precluding immedi-
ate IRS action to collect the entire penalty, 70 and filed a suit for determina-
tion of his liability. The United States sought to depose Mertsching in that
suit and Mertsching filed an objection to the deposition request, asserting
that the deposition would violate his fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.7 1 The district court granted the United States' motion to
compel discovery, advising Mertsching that his case would be dismissed if he
did not submit to deposition. 72 Mertsching refused to comply with the dis-
trict court's order, and the court granted the United States' motion to dis-
miss Mertsching's suit with prejudice.7 3 Mertsching appealed the dismissal
to the Tenth Circuit, claiming that the proceeding was criminal in nature,
and that he was therefore entitled to assert the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination to insulate himself from being deposed.
74
In affirming the order of the district court the Tenth Circuit noted that
the Supreme Court has held that the right against self-incrimination only
applies in suits where a responsive answer to a question, or an explanation of
why it cannot be answered, exposes the claimant to prosecution for a
crime.75 The Tenth Circuit further noted that the penalties assessed against
Mertsching were civil, not criminal. 76 The court therefore held that Mert-
sching had inappropriately claimed fifth amendment protection, and that
65. See genera//y United States v. Jones, 703 F.2d 473 (10th Cir. 1983).
66. Mertsching v. United States, 704 F.2d 505 (10th Cir.),cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 105 (1983);
United States v. Jones, 703 F.2d 473 (10th Cir. 1983).
67. 704 F.2d 505 (10th Cir.), cer. demed, 104 S. Ct. !05 (1983).
68. 704 F.2d at 506. The penalties were assessed pursuant to I.R.C. § 6694(a)(1982).
69. See 704 F.2d at 506 & n.2.
70. See I.R.C. § 6694(c)(1982).




75. Id. (citing Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 487 (1951)).
76. 704 F.2d at 506. The court's decision was reached by comparing 1.R.C. § 6694(a)
(1982), the source of liability for negligence by tax preparers, with I.R.C. § 6653 (1982), which
provides penalties for individuals negligently preparing their own tax returns. Section 6653 had
19841
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the district court had not abused its discretion in dismissing Mertsching's
action based on his failure to obey a court order to provide discovery.
77
B. United States v. Jones
In United Stales v. Jones, 78 the facts revealed that Mr. and Mrs. Jones had
been the subjects of an IRS investigation of their financial affairs over a ten
year period. The IRS had initiated a tax deficiency suit against the Joneses'
and had pursued a civil action against them to judgment. Because the
United States had collected only a small amount pursuant to that judgment,
however, Mr. Jones was asked to appear at a hearing in aid of execution of
judgment. 79 Jones appeared, and was questioned about the amount and
sources of his income and the nature and location of his assets. 80 Jones re-
fused to answer the questions, asserting his fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, and was held in contempt of court.8t At a later hearing
Mrs. Jones was also cited for contempt for refusing, on fifth amendment
grounds, to answer similar questions. 2 Both appealed the contempt
citations.
Jones' fifth amendment claim was based on the assertion that answering
the questions could provide incriminating evidence of two crimes: 1) making
a false statement to a federal officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 100183 and
2) attempted tax evasion under section 7201 of the Internal Revenue Code. 4
1. False Statements to IRS Agent
Prior to the hearing in aid of execution an IRS agent had interviewed
Jones.8 5 The agent filed an uncontested affidavit with the district court stat-
ing that Jones had not provided any information at that interview.8 6 The
Tenth Circuit observed that because Jones had made no statement, nothing
that he could have said at the judgment execution hearing could contradict
statements made to a federal officer. 8 7 Because there was therefore no basis
for criminal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, Jones had no reasonable
fear of criminal prosecution on which to base his fifth amendment claim. 88
The Tenth Circuit therefore rejected Jones' first ground for invoking the
fifth amendment privilege. 89
been consistently interpreted as creating civil liabilities; ergo, section 6694(a) created only civil
penalties. 704 F.2d at 507.
77. 704 F.2d at 507.
78. 703 F.2d 473 (10th Cir. 1983).
79. Id. at 474.
80. Id
81. Id at 475.
82. Id
83. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982).
84. I.R.C. § 7201 (1982).







2. Attempted Tax Evasion
The Tenth Circuit, however, vacated the district court's contempt order
against both Mr. and Mrs. Jones because of the potential of prosecution for
attempted tax evasion. 90 In an illuminating discussion of this area of law,
the Tenth Circuit detailed the factors which underlie a taxpayer's successful
assertion of the fifth amendment privilege.
The privilege against self-incrimination extends to civil actions, whether
the claimant is a party or a witness.9 1 The privilege is implicated when a
question requires either "answers that would in themselves support a convic-
tion" or answers that would "furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed
to prosecute the claimant for a crime."9 2 The witness may assert the privi-
lege when his fear of incrimination is "reasonable in light of the witness'
specific circumstances, the context of the questions, and the setting in which
the questions are asked." 93 The privilege exists only when a real danger of
prosecution exists; mere speculation that the answer will create a danger of
prosecution is insufficient.
94
In Jones' case, he had been the target of both civil and criminal investi-
gation by the IRS for more than ten years.95 In the early 1970's Jones had
been the target of a criminal investigation for tax fraud,96 but had been
given immunity in exchange for testimony which resulted in his law part-
ner's conviction for conspiracy to commit tax fraud. 97 Although the pro-
ceeding involving Jones' fifth amendment claim related to collecting a
judgment concerning tax years 1963-69, at the time of that proceeding the
IRS was suing Jones in a civil action for taxes allegedly owing for tax years
1973-79.98 The court found the civil tax deficiency litigation against Jones
indicative of both the IRS's institutional focus on Jones' tax behavior during
1973-79 and the IRS's belief that Jones had not accurately reported his in-
come during that period. 99 If it were true that Jones willfully failed to re-
port income for that period, he was subject to criminal prosecution. 10 0
Questions concerning the nature and location of his assets were therefore
potentially incriminating, even though asked in the context of an unrelated
civil proceeding.i 1i Given Jones' prior involvement with the IRS and the
ongoing civil deficiency proceedings, it was reasonable for him to fear that
his answers might provide "links in a chain of evidence on criminal charges
90. Id. at 478-79.
91. Id. at 475 (citing Maness v. Myers, 419 U.S. 449, 464 (1975); Kastigar v. United States,
406 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1972)).
92. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479. 486 (1951).
93. 703 F.2d at 476 (citing Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406
U.S. 472, 480 (1972); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1964); Hoffman v. United States, 341
U.S. 479, 486 (1951)).
94. 703 F.2d at 476. See Zicarelli v. New Jersey State Comm'n of Investigation, 406 U.S.
472 (1972).





100. A willful attempt to avoid tax liability is a felony. I.R.C. § 7201 (1982).
101. 703 F.2d at 476.
1984]
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of attempt to evade payment of taxes.'
1 0 2
3. IRS Use of Affidavits Asserting no Current Prosecution
The Tenth Circuit also addressed the propriety of the district court's
apparent reliance on an IRS affidavit in reaching its conclusion that Jones
was not entitled to assert the privilege against self-incrimination. 103 The af-
fidavit, prepared by an IRS agent, stated that no criminal charges had been
referred to the Justice Department and that no criminal investigation of
Jones was pending. 10 4 The court of appeals stated that the fact that no
criminal prosecution was pending was not a guarantee that there would be
no future prosecution, 10 5 and pointed out that the government might dis-
cover something from answers to its questions that might cause it to decide
to prosecute Jones criminally. 10 6 Because the district court's obligation in
the self-incrimination inquiry is solely to determine whether answers would
tend to incriminate the witness, the court acted incorrectly in attempting to
speculate whether the witness would in fact be prosecuted. 10 7 The court
noted that the government's legitimate interest in collecting judgments can-
not be allowed to override legitimate fifth amendment claims, and that if the
government was in fact interested only in collecting the civil judgment, it
could grant Jones immunity in exchange for the privileged information. '0 8
4. Derivative Claim of Immunity
Although Mrs. Jones was never herself the target of an IRS criminal
investigation, she was both a target of the civil investigation relating to the
1973-79 tax years and a party to the judgment debtor action relating to the
1963-69 tax years.' 0 9 The Tenth Circuit vacated the contempt order against
Mrs. Jones, holding that she shared her husband's reasons for fearing crimi-
nal prosecution for tax evasion.1 10 Because she had filed jointly with her
husband, questions relating to her husband's assets would tend to incrimi-
nate both spouses."' Therefore, she too could validly claim the protection
afforded by the fifth amendment.
112
C. Contrastzng Mertsching and Jones
In comparing the results in Mertsching and Jones, it is crucial to recog-
nize that in Mertschbng the fifth amendment claim was asserted under a stat-
ute which provided only civil penalties. 1 3 No potential for criminal
prosecution under any other statute could have resulted from Mertsching's
102. d. at 477.
103. Se id.
104. Id.








113. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
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compliance with the discovery order. In contrast, the Joneses' fifth amend-
ment claims were asserted with specific reference to a statute providing crim-
inal penalties for conduct which might be revealed by their answers.1 "4Jones
highlights the need for attorneys to be aware of the potential for prosecution
under criminal statutes when representing clients in civil tax proceedings.
V. THIRD-PARTY RECORDKEEPER CASES
Cases involving third-party recordkeepers' '5 are of great current inter-
est in the tax context as well as in the securities context.1 16 They involve
significant privacy issues. The Tenth Circuit considered a number of these
cases in the period covered by this survey.
Sections 7601-7611 of the Internal Revenue Code' 17 contain the provi-
sions for examination and inspection of tax records held by third parties.
The IRS is empowered to make such examinations and inspections as a
means of determining the tax liability of any person.'' 8 Pursuant to this
authority, the Internal Revenue Service may cause a summons to issue re-
quiring the taxpayer or any person having "possession, custody, or care of
books of account containing entries relating to the business of the taxpayer
to produce such records for inspection."' 19 Special procedures are provided
for third-party summonses.' 2 0  Where the summons does not identify the
person with respect to whose liability the summons is issued, a so-called
"John Doe summons" is used. 12 ' To obtain a John Doe summons, the IRS
must establish, in a court proceeding, 1) that the summons relates to an in-
vestigation directed at a particular person or group of persons; 2) that a
reasonable basis exists for believing that such person or group either has
failed, or may fail, to comply with the provisions of the internal revenue
laws; and 3) that the information sought to be obtained from an examina-
tion of the records, including the identity of the taxpayer, is not readily
available from other sources.1
22
A. Taxpayer Challenge to Validity ofjohn Doe Summons Permitted
United States v. Brigham Young Universty 123 is an especially interesting case
in this area of the law even though it has no precedential value.' 2 4 Brigham
114. See supra note 100 and accompanying text, and text accompanying notes 110-11.
115. A third-party recordkeeper is a person having possession, custody, or care of account-
ing books containing entries relating to a taxpayer's business. See I.R.C. § 7602(a)(2)(1982).
116. See Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc. v. S.E.C., 704 F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1983).
117. I.R.C. §§ 7601-7611 (1982).
118. See I.R.C. § 7601 (1982).
119. See I.R.C. § 7602(a)(2) (1982).
120. See generaly I.R.C. § 7609 (1982).
121. See generally Friedland, Internal Revenue Service Investigations of Unidentified Persons, 60 DEN.
L.J. 573 (1983).
122. See I.R.C. § 7609(f) (1982).
123. 679 F.2d 1345 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. granted and decision vacated and remanded for considera-
tion ofmootness, 103 S.Ct. 713, decision vacated and appeal dtsmissed on remand, No. 80-1508 (10th Cir.
April 13, 1983).
124. See infa text accompanying notes 146-48.
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Young University (BYU) is a tax exempt institution of higher learning.
125
Gifts to BYU are considered charitable contributions deductible from the
donor's income. 126 In the case of gifts in-kind, donors are allowed a deduc-
tion equal to the fair market value of the gift.'
27
The IRS had audited the returns of 162 donors of gifts in-kind to BYU,
and in every case discovered that the donor had overvalued his gift.' 28 The
IRS, after complying with statutorily required procedures, was granted a
John Doe summons. 129 BYU refused to comply with the summons1 30 and
the United States instituted enforcement proceedings. 13' At the enforce-
ment hearing, BYU asserted that the IRS had failed to establish a reason-
able basis for believing that the in-kind donations of the taxpayers whose
records were sought had been overvalued,' 32 and that the government had
therefore failed to comply with the statutory requirements for obtaining the
John Doe summons served on BYU.' 33 The district court agreed with BYU,
and refused to enforce the summons.
134 The United States appealed. 1
35
On appeal, the government asserted that BYU could not challenge, in
an enforcement proceeding, the determination made in the ex parte sum-
mons hearing that the IRS had established the required reasonable basis for
believing potential or actual violations of the tax laws existed. 136 The Tenth
Circuit disagreed, holding that although the initial determination of the gov-
ernment's reasonable basis could be made on an ex parte basis, a taxpayer
subject to an enforcement proceeding could challenge the summons on "any
appropriate grounds."' 137 Thus, BYU had the right to challenge the reason-
ableness of the IRS's belief that BYU's in-kind donors might have violated
the revenue laws.'
38
The Tenth Circuit concluded, however, that the IRS had in fact estab-
125. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1982), which exempts from taxation corporations organized and
operated exclusively for educational purposes.
126. See I.R.C. § 170(a)(l), (c)(2) (1982).
127. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-l(c)(1), T.D. 7207, 1972-2 C.B. 108, 116.
128. 679 F.2d at 1348.
129. Id at 1346-47. I.R.C. § 7609(l) (1982) requires a showing of relevance and necessity to
obtain a John Doe summons. I.R.C. § 7609(h)(1) (1982) provides that such a summons may
issue after an ex parse hearing in which the court may determine the facts solely on the basis of
the IRS's petition and supporting documents.
130. 679 F.2d at 1347.
131. Id I.R.C. § 7402(b)(1982) and I.R.C. § 7604(a)(1982) both grant federal district courts
jurisdiction to enforce an IRS summons.
132. 679 F.2d at 1347.
133. Id. As noted above, under I.R.C. § 7609(0(1982) a John Doe summons will not be
issued unless the IRS shows it has a reasonable basis for believing the object of its investigation
may fail, or may have failed, to comply with the internal revenue laws. See supra note 122 and
accompanying text.
134. 679 F.2d at 1347.
135. Id. at 1346.
136. Id. at 1347.
137. Id at 1348 (citing Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 446 (1964)). Accord United States
v. Pittsburgh Trade Exch., Inc., 644 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1981). The Tenth Circuit also indicated
that the district court had the power, in an enforcement proceeding, to challenge a John Doe
summons sua sponte. See 679 F.2d at 1348 (citing United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 58
(1964)).
138. 679 F.2d at 1348.
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lished the required "reasonable belief." 139 The government had audited the
returns of 162 contributors in kind to BYU, and every contributor had
claimed a deduction for more than the fair market value of his gift.' 40 The
government argued, and the Tenth Circuit agreed, that this constituted a
reasonable basis for believing that BYU's other contributors of gifts in-kind
might also have overvalued their gifts.14 1 The court cited decisions in the
Third' 42 and Sixth' 4 3 Circuits to support its holding that the test the IRS
must meet in order to enforce a John Doe summons is one of "reasonable-
ness," not of certainty. 14
4
Pending Supreme Court review of a petition for certiorari, BYU pro-
duced the names of the contributors of gifts in-kind, whereupon, pursuant to
the procedure mandated by the Supreme Court decision in United States v.
Munsingwear,'145 the government moved to dismiss the appeal on grounds of
mootness. 14 6 The Supreme Court then vacated the Tenth Circuit's decision
and remanded the case for the Tenth Circuit to consider the issue of moot-
ness. 147 The Tenth Circuit then vacated its judgment, withdrew its opinion,
and dismissed the appeal. ' 48 The author has included the discussion of this
case not for its precedential value, but rather to illuminate the Tenth Cir-
cuit's analysis in this important area of law.
B. Limiting Recordkeeper Summonses on Relevancy and Undue Burden Grounds
In United States v. Southwestern Bank & Trust Co. ,149 the Tenth Circuit
considered the standards for judicial enforcement of a third-party record-
keeper summons.
1. Standard of Relevancy
In Southwestern Bank, the IRS was investigating the 1977-78 tax liability
of three individual taxpayers and five corporations in which the individual
taxpayers had an ownership interest. 150 Recordkeeper summonses sought
bank records, including checks, loan records, and deposit records, pertaining
to individual and corporate transactions from February 1, 1976 through
May 31, 1979.151 The IRS asserted a need for the documents in order to
determine whether corporate distributions to the individual taxpayers dur-
ing 1977 and 1978 were properly characterized as dividends or as return of
capital.' 52 The taxpayers intervened' 53 and instructed the bank not to com-
139. Id. at 1350.
140. Id. at 1349.
141. Id The Tenth Circuit emphasized that the IRS was only required to establish that a
taxpayer might have failed to comply with the tax laws. Id.
142. United States v. Pittsburgh Trade Exch., Inc., 644 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1981).
143. In re Tax Liability of John Does, 671 F.2d 977 (6th Cir. 1982).
144. 679 F.2d at 1349.
145. 340 U.S. 36 (1950).
146. See United States v. Brigham Young Univ., 103 S.Ct. 713 (1983).
147. Id.
148. United States v. Brigham Young Univ., No. 80-1508 (10th Cir. April 13, 1983).
149. 693 F.2d 994 (10th Cir. 1982).





ply with the summons.154 When the IRS sought judicial enforcement of the
summonses, the taxpayers objected on the basis that the information sought
was not relevant to the IRS investigation.' 5 5 The district court refused to
order enforcement of the entire summons, finding some of the requested
records and checks not relevant to the IRS's investigation.1
56
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's order denying enforce-
ment in part, holding that a summons seeking records must be enforced
upon a showing that the IRS has complied with proper administrative pro-
cedures, that the information sought is not in IRS possession, and that the
material sought may be relevant to a proper purpose.' 5 7 Material is relevant
for summons enforcement purposes if it tends to shed light on the accuracy
of a taxpayer's return. 1
58
An IRS agent testified that the corporate bank records for the entire
corporate year would aid the IRS in ascertaining the accuracy of the taxpay-
ers' returns.' 59 The court found that this uncontroverted testimony satisfied
the relevancy standard, and reversed the district court order denying pro-
duction of specified corporate records.'16
The district court's denial of IRS request for production of all checks
cashed by taxpayers during the periods in question was mooted on appeal
when the intervenors agreed with the government that the materials sought
were relevant.' 6 ' The Tenth Circuit pointed out, however, that the judici-
ary had discretion to limit the required compliance to protect the third-party
recordkeeper from excessive burden or expense in complying with the sum-
mons.' 6 2 The court then remanded the case to allow the district court to
consider appropriate limitations and procedures for enforcing the
summons. 1
6 3
VI. CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING WHETHER PERIODIC PAYMENTS ARE
ALIMONY OR PROPERTY SETTLEMENT
At issue in Gammill v. Commzsszner 16 4 was whether periodic payments
made to an ex-spouse were tax deductible alimony payments or non-deducti-
153. Under I.R.C. § 7609(a)(1) (1982) the person(s) whose records have been summoned is
entitled to notice of that fact after service of the summons. Under id. § 7609(b)(2) that person is
entitled to intervene in any proceeding with respect to enforcement of the summons and to
request the recordkeeper not to comply with the summons. If the taxpayer instructs the
recordkeeper to withhold the records, the IRS must either obtain the individual's consent or a
court order before it can force the recordkeeper to provide the requested information. Id.
154. 693 F.2d at 995.
155. See id at 995-96.
156. Id at 995.
157. Id (quoting United States v. City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 642 F.2d 388, 389 (10th Cir.
1981) (quoting United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964))).
158. 693 F.2d at 996 (citing City Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 642 F.2d 388, 389 (10th Cir. 1981)
(quoting United States v. Davey, 543 F.2d 996, 1000 (2d Cir. 1976))).





164. 710 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1982).
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ble installment payments made pursuant to a property settlement.
165
A. The Tax Court Decision
The IRS assessed tax deficiencies against Gammill because he had
treated payments to his ex-spouse, Marjorie, as deductible alimony rather
than as non-deductible payments pursuant to a property settlement. ' 66 The
Tax Court held that the payments were not alimony but were part of a
property settlement, and ordered Gammill to pay the amount of the disal-
lowed deductions.' 6 7 The Tax Court determined the nature of the pay-
ments by reference to general characterization principles and by reference to
the law of Oklahoma, 68 where the Gammills were divorced. 169 The Tax
Court noted that Oklahoma law permitted a court granting a divorce to
designate, in the divorce decree, the dollar amount of any periodic payments
which were for support. 170 The Tax Court found it significant that lan-
guage requiring the payments to be regarded as alimony was absent from
the Gammills' divorce decree. 17 In light of the language of the decree, the
amount of the total payments, and Mrs. Gammill's contribution to the mar-
riage, the Tax Court held that the payments did not constitute alimony. '
72
B. The Tenth Circuit Deciszon
In reviewing the Tax Court's determination, the Tenth Circuit noted
that under the Internal Revenue Code payments which are "periodic" and
"arise out of a family or marital obligation to support" are includible in the
recipient's taxable income,' 7
3 and are therefore deductible as alimony.
174
Since Gammill's payments extended over a period of more than ten years
they were periodic.' 75 Thus, the issue was whether the payments constituted
a support obligation.1
76
In affirming the Tax Court's determination that the payments were a
property settlement, rather than a support obligation, the court enumerated
five factors as guides to determine the nature of periodic payments made
following a divorce: 1) whether there was a fixed sum, 2) whether the pay-
ments are related to the obligor's income, 3) whether the payments continue
despite the obligee's death or remarriage, 4) whether the obligee gives con-
sideration for the payments, and 5) whether the obligor provides security to
165. Id. at 608. Alimony payments are deductible under I.R.C. § 215 (1982).
166. 710 F.2d at 608.
167. Gammill v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 921, 926 (1980), a~fd, 710 F.2d 607 (10th Cir.
i982).
168. 73 T.C. at 926-30.
169. 710 F.2d at 608.
170. 73 T.C. at 927 & n.4 (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1289(B)(1971) (recodified as
amended at OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1289(A)(1981))).
171. 73 T.C. at 927.
172. 73 T.C. at 926.
173. See I.R.C. § 71(a)(1982).
174. 710 F.2d at 608-09. See I.R.C. § 215 (1982) (providing deduction for alimony
payments).




ensure payment. 17 7 If these factors are present, payments are to be consid-
ered a property settlement.17 8 The Tenth Circuit found the payments to be
in satisfaction of a property settlement on the basis of the following facts:
1) at the time of the divorce, the.Gammills entered into an agreement enti-
tled "Property Settlement Agreement" under which a lump sum was paya-
ble in equal monthly installments over a twenty-year period, 2) the amount
was secured by a lien against a portion of stock owned by Mr. Gammill,
3) the divorce decree referred to the lump sum amount as "part of" property
and assets set over to Marjorie Gammill, 4) the entire amount unpaid was
due upon the death of Gammill or if he was in default more than thirty days,
and 5) the property settlement would inure to the benefit of Marjorie's heirs
and assigns, should she die prior to the complete payment of all
installments. "9
VII. CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING TIME OF A STOCK REDEMPTION
In Barton Theater Co. v. Commzssioner,180 the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
United States Tax Court's determination that a stock redemption had oc-
curred in 1966 rather than, as Barton alleged, in 1967.181 The court noted
that a decision on the timing of the redemption is not fixed by the time the
shares are transferred, but is based on a practical consideration of all the
facts surrounding a transaction.182 The factors which persuaded the Tax
Court, and the Tenth Circuit, that the redemption took place in 1966 were
the presence of: 1) formal agreements covering the redemption and all its
details, signed and notorized in January, 1966; 2) 1966 accounting entries on
the books of both corporations involved reflecting full consummation of the
agreement; 3) audited balance sheets for both corporations reflecting the fact
that the redemption was completed in 1966; 4) a 1969 proxy agreement and
a 1970 letter declaring that Barton had acquired the shares of Atlas Corpo-
ration in January, 1966; and 5) Barton's Board of Directors minutes adopt-
ing the stock redemption agreement at a January 1, 1966 meeting. 18 3 All
these factors, stated the court, reflected the intention of the parties that the
redemption occur in 1966.184
Jennifer K. Stern
177. Id at 610. These five factors were first listed in Riley v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d 768
(10th Cir. 1981).
178. 710 F.2d at 610.
179. Id. at 608-09.
180. 701 F.2d 126 (10th Cir. 1983).
181. Id at 128.
182. Id. The following factors were listed as significant: passage of legal title; transfer of
possession; fixed sales price; timing of transfer of consideration; the parties' intention; the lan-
guage of the agreements; and whether the parties have chosen a particular effective date for the
agreement. See id.
183. Id. at 128-29.
184. Id. at 128.
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